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STUDENT NOTES
The Scope of Permissible Cross-Examination of a
Party Litigant or Defendant in a Jury Trial in
West Virginia
Two fundamental restrictions limit the permissible scope of the
cross-examination of a party litigant or defendant in a jury trial.'
One is the evidentiary restriction limiting cross-examination to those
matters discussed in chief, and the second is the constitutional
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. The purpose of this
note is to examine the development and application of these restric-
tions in West Virginia jurisprudence.
To this list could also be added a third restriction, that of incompetency.
Under the common law and during the period when this nation was formed,
a person charged with a criminal offense was incompetent to testify under oath
in his own behalf at his trial. He was at times permitted to make certain
statements to the jury while not under oath, but he was not subject to cross-
examination on such utterances. This restriction is, however, of little present-
day importance since Georgia is the only jurisdiction in the common law world
to retain this rule. See, Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1960).
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E XAMINATION IN CHIEF
Apart from the problem of self-incrimination, the permissible
latitude of cross-examination of a party litigant in a civil case may
be substantially different in West Virginia from that permitted when
a defendant is being examined in a criminal case. To aid in an
understanding of these differences it will be helpful to examine the
latitude of permissible cross-examination (1) in a civil case where
a witness and then a party litigant is being cross-examined, and (2)
in a criminal case where a witness and then the defendant is being
cross-examined.
CIVIL CASES
The majority prevailing evidentiary rule in this country is that,
in a civil case where the non-litigant witness is testifying, the cross-
examination must be limited to those areas which were covered by
the examination in chief.2 Within the discretion of the court, however,
the witness may be cross-examined as to matters not touched upon
in the examination in chief for the purpose of impeachment as to
affect the credibility of the testimony of the writness.' West Virginia
is in accord with these general principles.' Generally, in this country,
when a party litigant is a witness in a civil case, cross-examination
will be similarly limited, but West Virginia appears to deviate from
this generally accepted pattern.
In Ingles v. Stealey,5 the defendant had executed a note to one
Hellem who in turn assigned it to plaintiff. Defendant took the stand
and was cross-examined, over objection of his counsel, as to sub-
stantative matters not touched upon in the examination in chief.
The court held, upon appeal, that "a party to a suit may, on cross-
examination, be questioned in regard to any matter pertinent to the
issue, whether he testified thereto in his examination in chief or not."'
2 McComcncic, EVIDENCE § 21 (1954). For an excellent discussion of
the desirability of the various views regulating the latitude of permissible cross-
examination see, 6 WiGoRE, EVIDENCE § 1887-1890 (3d ed. 1940).
3 McCommcK op. cit. supra note 2, § 22.
4 Lambert v. Armentrout, 65 W. Va. 375, 64 S.E. 260 (1909).
-85 W. Va. 155, 101 S.E. 167 (1919).
6 It is interesting to note that as authority for this holding the court cites
McManus v. Mason, 43 W. Va. 196, 27 S.E. 293 (1897). It is submitted that
at best this case is doubtful authority for this proposition, for while the
McManus case is hot free from ambiguity, its indicated basis in sanctioning
cross-examination beyond that in chief was for the purpose of attacking the
party litigant's credibility and not for substantive purposes. Twelve years after
the McManus case was decided, the court held in Lambert v. Armentrout,
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It appears, therefore, that a wide open cross-examination of a party
litigant is permitted in a civil case in West Virginia. A somewhat
analogous end result could be reached by liberal application of Rule
43(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure permitting
more latitude in examination and cross-examination of a party liti-
gant.
CRIMINAL CASES
In criminal cases the evidentiary rules concerning cross-examina-
tion of a witness are analogous to those in civil cases. "Generally,
a witness cannot be cross-examined as to matters not gone into on
the direct examination, unless the question asked tends to show
motive, interest, an animus, or unless it is for the purpose of testing
his memory or credibility or laying the basis for impeachment."'
West Virginia would again seem to be in accord with these general
principles.' But authorities differ concerning the permissible latitude
of cross-examination as to substantive matters when a defendant in a
criminal case is being questioned. Some courts permit a wider latitude
of cross-examination than when a regular witness is being questioned,
somewhat analogous to West Virginia's practice in civil cases, while
other courts restrict cross-examination of the accused as in the case
of other witnesses.9 In West Virginia, the permissible scope of the
cross-examination of a defendant in a criminal case is at least partly
controlled by statute which provides that the accused ". . . shall be
subject to cross-examination as any other witness. ... .
The problem that is immediately presented is what is meant by the
language "any other witness." If the court were to construe this stat-
utory language to mean any other non-party litigant witness, then the
scope of the cross-examination of a defendant would be limited to
the scope of his examination in chief and West Virginia would be in
accord with the majority rule. If, however, the statutory language
is construed to include a party litigant in the meaning of "any other
supra, when aparty litigant was upon the stand that he could not, for substan-
tive purposes, be cross-examined "'... beyond facts elicited on his examination
in chief. It is, therefore, highly probable that the expansion of the scope of
cross-examination n a civil case where a party litigant is involved was the
product of a judicial misinterpretation of the basis of a prior court decision.73 WHARTON CnlxmaLr EVmlE § 868 (12th ed. 1955).
8 State v. Price, 92 W. Va. 542, 115 S.E. 393 (1922); State v. Carr, 65
W. Va. 81, 63 S.E. 766 (1909).
9 3 WHARTON, op. cit. supra Note 7, § 887.
10 W. VA. CODE ch. 57, art. 3, § 6 (Michie 1961). Virginia has an ana-
logous statutory provision. VA. CODE ch. 19.1-264 (Michie 1950).
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witness" and the court were to follow the rule of Ingles v. Stealey,
then the scope of cross-examination of a defendant in a criminal case
would be analogous to the scope of cross-examination in a civil case
and a wide open cross-examination of a defendant would be permis-
sible, subject, of course, to self-incrimination and other recognized
limitations." No case authority precisely in point has been found,
but the examination of certain West Virginia criminal cases may be
helpful.
In State v. Friedman," defendant was convicted of the statutory
offense of sodomy. Upon cross-examination, defendant, over the ob-
jection of his counsel, was required to answer questions as to prior
convictions. The court, while seemingly confusing the self-incrimina-
tion section of the statute with that section defining the scope of per-
missible cross-examination, held "the right to cross-examination 'as
any other witness' implied the right to impeach his credibility by the
same rules as those applicable to other witnesses," relying upon
Thaniel v. Commonwealth" as authority. Numerous West Virginia
cases are in accord.' 4 It is thus seen that the court has treated a
defendant in a criminal case much the same as any other witness
with reference to matters affecting his credibility, but this sheds little
light on whether the court would permit a wide open cross-examina-
tion of the accused. A literal interpretation of the statute would
indicate that it would not.
SELF-INCRIMINATION
The second major limitation upon the permissible scope of cross-
examination in a jury trial is concerned with the self-incrimination
privilege. A comprehensive discussion of this constitutional privilege
is beyond the scope of this note,'" and only those aspects of the
privilege peculiar to the limitation of cross-examination of a party
litigant in a civil case or a defendant in a criminal case will be con-
sidered.
" The same result could be reached if the court would hold that the
statute is only applicable to the problem of self-incrimination.
2 124 W. Va. 4, 18 S.E.2d 653 (1942).
3 132 Va. 795, 11 S.E. 259 (1922).
'4 State v. Riss & Co., 139 W. Va. 1, 80 S.E.2d 9 (1953); State v.
Blankenship, 137 W. Va. 1, 69 S.E.2d 398 (1952) and cases cited therein;
State v. LaRosa, 129 W. Va. 634, 41 S.E. 2d 1921 (1946).
"5 For a good general discussion of the area of self-incrimination and con-
trasting views as to the desirability of this constitutional privilege, see Borarsky,
The Right of the Accused in a Criminal Case Not to be Compelled to Be a
Witness Against Himself, 35 W. VA. L. REv. 27, 126 (1929); Sloven, Some
Comments on Self-Incrimination, 70 AmAL ILE'oRT OF TiE W. VA. BAn
Ass'N. 76 (1954).
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The West Virginia Constitution provides in part: "..... nor shall
any person, in any criminal case, be compelled to be a witness against
himself .. ."" This constitutional privilege is not limited merely
to criminal cases wherein the defendant is a witness, but it is applic-
able to any judicial proceeding, civil or criminal."7 The privilege is
a private one, and, if a party litigant has answered questions upon
examination in chief without objection, or without claiming the priv-
ilege, he will be deemed to have waived the right to object to
incriminating questions upon cross-examination relating to his exam-
ination in chief. However, the party litigant could claim his self-
incrimination privilege upon cross-examination as to those matters
not discussed in his examination in chief."8
If the party litigant be given sufficient immunity from criminal
prosecution, he cannot refuse to testify on the ground of self-incrim-
ination. The West Virginia Code provides that "in a criminal
prosecution other than for perjury, evidence shall not be given
against the accused of any statement made by him as a witness upon
a legal examination,"' 9 but "the constitutional privilege of silence
cannot be taken away by statute unless absolute immunity is pro-
vided . . ." and " . . . a provision merely that the testimony of a
wtiness should not be used against him, does not secure such absolute
immunity."'" Since this statute does not provide the absolute im-
munity required to protect a party litigant from being subsequently
prosecuted as a result of statements made during a civil case, the
constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is still
available to a party litigant in a civil case in West Virginia
The defendant's invocation of the constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination in a criminal case is largely regulated by the West
Virginia Code which provides that, in a criminal case, where the
accused voluntarily "... becomes a witness he shall, as to all matters
relevant to the issue, be deemed to have waived his privilege of not
giving evidence against himself.... ." It should be noted that this
statute is only applicable in a criminal case when a defendant is
being cross-examined.
16 W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 5 (1872).
17 Dellostatious v. Boyce, 152 Va. 368, 147 S.E. 267 (1929); 3 WHARTON,
op. cit. supra Note 7, § 721.18 3 WHARTON, op. cit. supra Note 7, § 730.
'9 W. VA. CODE ch. 57, art. 2, § 3 (Michie 1961).
20 20 M.J. Witnesses § 81 (1952).
2W. VA. CODE ch. 57, art. 3, § 6 (Michie 1961). Virginia has an ana-
logous stautory provision. Va. Code ch. 19.1-264 (Michie 1950).
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It has been generally held that a waiver provision such as appears
in the West Virginia statute will not deprive a defendant of his con-
stitutional privilege if he has not understandingly and willingly taken
the stand after being warned of the consequences of such an act.22
Similarly, a defendant will not have waived his constitutional priv-
ilege merely because he testified to such collateral matters as the
qualification of jurors or the change of venue.2
The phrase "..... all matters relevant to the issue ... " has been
construed in several court decisions.2
In State v. Foley,25 defendant and another were trying to obtain
support for their respective unions which they represented in a
coming election. Certain elements of the local population were
against the unionization of the workers of the area and threatened
Foley and the other union representatives with violence. In the re-
sulting skirmish two persons were shot. Upon cross-examination in
his subsequent murder trial, Foley was forced to answer that he had
no license to carry a pistol at the time the killing took place. Upon
appeal, the court held that Foley had been forced to be a witness
against himself as to a matter not relevant to his guilt or innocence
and that reversible error had thus been committed.2"
In the recent case of State v. Simmons,2" the deceased and his
friend, both senior students at Davis & Elkins College, were return-
ing to the college late in the evening when the deceased stopped
beside the trailer home of defendant and beat upon it with a piece
of wood. After a short time defendant appeared at the door of the
trailer and fired a shot which hit Moore. Subsequently defendant
struck deceased with the rifle and in the ensuing struggle deceased
was shot three times. He died a few hours later as a result of these
injuries. At his trial for the murder of deceased, defendant was
22Powell v. Commonwealth, 167 Va. 558, 189 S.E. 433 (1937).
23 Enoch v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 411, 126 S.E. 222 (1925).24 This phrase is not contained in the analogous Virginia Statute VA. CoDE
ch. 19.1-264 (Michie 1950), and may somewhat limit the implied waiver of
a defendant's constitutional privilege when he elects to testify.
25 128 W. Va. 166, 35 S.E.2d 854 (1945).
26 In the more recent case of State v. Bragg, 140 W. Va. 585, 87 S.E.2d
689 (1955), the court reaffirmed this position in a situation analogous to the
Foley case, stating that "this court has never departed from the principle that
the accused in a criminal case is protected against compulsory self-incrimination.
This principle was inherent in the common law, both in England and the
Colonies, and was recognized in the Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776. It is
applicable, in our opinion, to the instant case.
27 135 S.E.2d 257 (W. Va. 1964).
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forced to answer, upon cross-examination, as to whether he had been
selling liquor at his trailer home. The trial court instructed the jury
that such evidence could only be considered for the purpose of im-
peachment. In reversing defendant's conviction, the appellate court
held that the issue in the case was whether defendant was guilty of
murder. "Whether the defendant sold whiskey is not a matter relevant
to the issue and compelling the defendant to reply to this improper
question is a violation of his rights under the reasoning of the pro-
visions of Code, 1931, 57-3-6."
The court has, however, permitted cross-examination with refer-
ence to prior convictions apparently considering such to be "relevant
to the issue" of a defendants' guilt or innocence in that such evidence
will affect his credibility. 8
CONCLUSION
The rules controlling the permissible latitude of cross-examination
of a party litigant in a civil case appears to be well established. While
the majority rule would limit cross-examination to those matters
touched upon in chief, except for the purposes of impeachment or
credibility, West Virginia follows the minority rule and permits the
cross-examination of the party litigant to range over the entire case.
A limitation, however, is imposed upon this rule by the constitu-
tional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination which is ap-
plicable in a civil case. While the party litigant may not claim this
privilege so as to bar cross-examination as to matters voluntarily
testified to in chief, yet he may claim the privilege when cross-
examined as to matters outside his examination in chief which would
tend to incriminate him.
The rules regulating the permissible scope of cross-examination
of a defendant in a criminal case are not so clearly settled. By
statute West Virginia has provided the accused shall be subject to
cross-examination as any other witness. Since the ordinary witness
may only, for substantive purposes, be examined as to those areas
touched upon in his examination in chief, the cross-examination of
the accused, when a witness, might be similarly restricted. The other
alternative would be for the court to construe the words "any other
witness" to include a defendant and permit a wide open cross-exam-
ination as applied to civil cases where a party litigant is being cross-
examined.
28 State v. Pettock, 133 W. Va. 645, 169 S.E. 480 (1933).
1964]
7
Luce: The Scope of Permissible Cross-Examination of a Party Litigant or
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1964
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
The constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination
will also be a limitation on the cross-examination of a defendant.
If a defendant, after being warned of the consequences of his act,
voluntarily takes the stand and testifies, the West Virginia Code
provides that he voluntarily waives his right to claim the constitu-
tional privilege as to all matters relevant to the issue. This provision
has been interpreted to mean, in two limited situations, that a de-
fendant may be compelled to answer questions relating to prior
convictions, but not as to whether he had a license to carry a weapon
with which a homicide was committed. A more comprehensive in-
terpretation of this statutory provision awaits further court decisions.
In view of the federal and state constitutional guaranties against
compulsory self-incrimination, other constitutional and statutory guar-
antees as to trial procedures in the interest of the accused in criminal
cases, and the generally recognized presumption of innocence, one
may well ponder the development of the law, particularly the rules
of evidence, with reference to the permissible limits of cross-exam-
ination of the defendant when on trial in a criminal case. Firmly
recognized in American jurisprudence is the principle that truth and
justice are the objects of judicial proceedings. Certainly this principle
is to be weighed in the balances in shaping tomorrow's law by legis-
lation and court decisions.
Lee Ames Luce
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